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»Is there a need for a coded language in central banking «? 
PD Dr. Elke Muchlinski, M.A. Phil.
1




»The times, they are a changin'…"attitudes and policies toward central bank 
communications have undergone a radical transformation in recent years. Not 
long ago, secrecy was the byword in central banking circles. Now the 
unmistakable trend is toward greater openness and transparency. Increasingly, 
central banks of the world are trying to make themselves understood, rather than 
leaving their thinking shrouded in mystery (Blinder/Goodhart 2001:1).«
2
 
Changing times inevitably include changing questions and the acceptance of an 
interdisciplinary approach to macroeconomic theory. The consequences are 
significantly.
3 It has initiated a theoretical upheaval on modern central bank theory. 
This is also true for the topics of research related to a central bank's interactive 
procedures touching its market interdependencies and relations. The focus on the 
central bank's way of acting, its use of language and modes of communicative 
interactions has also been drawing much attention.  
The scientific process is not based on the avoidance of alternative questions and 
methods of expositions. This is true for central banking and macroeconomics. In his 
presidential address Akerlof demanded an interdisciplinary approach to macroeconomic 
theory to replace the prevailing concepts with modified concepts supported by research 
                                                           
1 I thank Susan Hechler (Berlin) for critical comments on the English version of my paper. This 
paper is an introduction of the forthcoming book: Muchlinski, Elke (2009) Central Banks and 
Coded Language. Risks and Benefits. Palgrave Macmillan. 
2 Blinder, Alan/Goodhart, Charles/Hildebrand, Philipp/Lipton, David/Wyplosz, Charles (2001) 
(Eds.) How Do Central Banks Talk? International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies 
(ICMB), Geneva Reports on the World Economy, No 3, Geneva/Oxford. 
3 I gave a first approach to that issue: Muchlinski, Elke (2002) Die Fed im Kontext der 
Transparency Debatte. In: Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der 
Freien Universität Berlin, Nr. 2002/19, ISBN: 3-935058-46-2. Muchlinski, Elke (2005) Central 
Bank Transparency: Reasons for 'Creative Ambiguity'. In: Hölscher, Jens/Tomann, Horst (Eds.) 
(2005)  Globalization of Capital Markets and Monetary Policy. Palgrave, Macmillan: 
Houndsmills, Basingstoke et al: 130-147. Muchlinski, Elke (2008) Sprache, Bedeutung und 
Verstehen in der Ökonomik – Eine kodierte Sprache für die Federal Reserve Bank? In: Kabalak, 
Alikan/Priddat, Birger/Smirnova, Elena (2008) Ökonomie, Sprache und Kommunikation. 
Neuere Einsichten zur Ökonomie. Metropolis Verlag, Marburg: 86-117. PD Dr. Elke Muchlinski 02/2009  3
in sociology and psychology.
4 I would like to propose that modern economic 
institutions, like central banking, too, should link the premises of central bank 
communication to new researches in language sciences. 
My paper sheds light on the importance of the creation of meaning and 
understanding of words and sentences within the context of central banking.
5 The first 
type deals with the implications and consequences of the new paradigm of central 
banks »matching deeds to words«.
6 The new paradigm refers implicitly to modern 
language sciences and cognitive sciences. 
A second type of consideration focuses on the central question: Is there a need 
for a coded language? The implication I am going to explain in this paper emerges 
from the proposition that words and sentences have no meaning beyond their use in a 
particular context. In contrast to that – a coded language is an artificial language.  
My hypothesis is that uncertainty which is the landscape of central banking 
would be increased by the use of a coded language. In contrast to a coded language, the 
use of everyday language – the language in practice – configures a certain context 
understood by participants of the financial market and the central bank. I want to bring 
the central bank literature into dialogue with important research in  the language 
sciences which are important for social sciences.  
 
JEL: A12, B25, E42, E52, E58, F 33, F58, Z13 
Key words: Central banks and their policies, institutions, communication, language and 
meaning 
 
                                                           
4 Akerlof, George A. (2007) The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics. Presidential Address, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 9 (1), 5-36. 
5 I gave a first introduction to both types: Muchlinski, Elke (2007) Central Banks: Transparency 
or Bafflement? From 'monetary mystique' to 'matching deeds to words'. Habilitationsschrift 
submitted to the Faculty of Economics, Free University of Berlin, 09 May 2007. 
6 Blinder, Alan S. (1998) Central Banking in Theory and Practice. Cambridge, Massachusetts et 
al.  Blinder, A./Ehrmann, M./Fratzscher, Marcel/De Haan, Jakob/Jansen, David-Jan (2008) 
Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence. In: 
Journal of Economic Literature 2008, 46-4: 910-945. 
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First type of consideration: the implications and consequences 
of the new paradigm of central banks »matching deeds to words« 
 
"The central bank owes the public transparency and 
accountability. Communication is at the heart of both" 
(Blinder/Goodhart et al 2001: 2). 
 
My contribution is concerned with the new paradigm of central banking. 
According to the modern view on central banks, credibility, accountability and 
transparency refer to the central bank practice. Discourse on central bank transparency 
and communication has been moving beyond the silence of a black box mechanism as 
proposed by model view. Blinder (2004) pointed to the revolutionary changes of 
modern central banking as a "quiet revolution".
7  
"A central bank is invested with enormous power over the economy; and, if it is 
independent, that power is virtually unchecked. This authority is a public trust 
assigned to the bank by the body politic. In return, the citizenry has a right to expect 
– no, to demand – that the bank's actions match its words. To me, that is the 
hallmark of credibility: matching deeds to words" (Blinder 1998: 63-64). 
 
As Issing also emphasized, transparency implies "we do what we say and we say 
what we do", whereas accountability means "we do what we are supposed to do".
8
Modern central banks today have already ceased to picture themselves as 
temples of secrecy rooted in the realm of metaphysics and unable to communicate and 
explain their procedures.
9 A central bank or institution respectively, acts within 
historical and contextual forms of life and norms. The success of a central bank's 
communicative interactions with the agents of financial markets is not rooted in 
reference to presumed invariant structures of the markets themselves. Any 
communicative interaction of the central bank affects and shapes its environment and 
therefore the context of its action. The goal of a central bank, its mandate of price 
                                                           
7 Blinder, Alan S. (2004) The Quiet Revolution. Central Banking Goes Modern. Yale University 
Press, New Haven & London. 
8 Issing, Otmar (1999) The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or 'Willem in Euroland'. 
In: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3: 503-19: 508. 
9 Greider, William (1989) Secrets of the Temple. How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country. 
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stability, its policy and instruments are not phenomena of nature and hence not issues of 
natural science. The concepts of social science are not embedded in natural science or 
natural laws.  
Paper money is created by the central bank based on certain principles, foremost 
of which is the acceptability of its role by society. The acceptability of a central bank's 
money depends on how money possesses credibility as a store of value, a standard of 
deferred payment and medium of account. Money is neither neutral nor a so called 
bank’s positions. Words and sentences have no meaning beyond their use in a context. 
"veil" of barter economy. Any action of a central bank is itself a part of conceptual 
actions within a complex situation. It is for this reason that a central bank’s talk matters 
and why it gives the use of language an important role in shaping the central bank’s 
positions. Words and sentences have no meaning beyond their use in a context. "Every 
sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? – In use it is alive" (Wittgenstein).
10
Knowledge of context is also created and embodies a central bank's history that 
can be described only by using concepts expressed in language. These concepts are 
impregnated by their use in historical context and have to be reread in the light of 
current debates of cognitive and language sciences. The history of central banks, 
conceptually understood, can be judged and described by their applied concepts and 
implemented actions in the past and now. The new paradigm "matching deeds to words" 
implies the acknowledgement of language as a social fact – as it is known in literature 
and philosophy of language and science, rather than acknowledged in economic 
science. Language is not a vehicle which transmits an already given meaning like a 
billiard ball carried and thrown out of a box. The function of language activity in a 
dialog – even the communicative interaction of the central bank with non-homogeneous 
agents of the financial market is a dialog – derives from the wish to be understood. 
People communicate to reach a common goal or understanding.  
"Nothing could be more obvious: we want to be understood, and others have an 




                                                           
10 Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1978) Philosophical Investigation. Basil Blackwell Oxford 
11 Davidson, Donald (1994) The Social Aspect of Language. In: McGuiness, Brian/Oliveri, 
Gianluigi (Eds.) (1994) The Philosophy of Michael Dummet, Kluwer Academic Publisher, 
Dodrecht, et al: 1-16: 9. Is there a need for a coded language in central banking?  6
This is also true for institutions which communicate through people, agents and 
– for instance – the chairman of a central bank. 
Research on transparency and language aspects of central banks has flourished 
over the past years. This first type of consideration summarized briefly the main reasons 
why central banks have chosen to become more transparent in explaining the value of 
transparency in conducting monetary policy.  
Modern central bank theory has been passing beyond the silent black box 
mechanism. For instance, the Fed has been walking a long way from "monetary 
mystique and secrecy" towards new methods of communicative interactions 
(Goodfriend).
12 The Federal Reserve's road to transparency, flexibility and monetary 
policy is evident: Since its 'turning point' in the year 1994 the Federal Reserve has been 
avoiding misleading analogies and rigid rules. The Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) has 
been moving out of "monetary mystique" towards "matching deeds to words".  
This is also true for academic discourses on central bank statements, which have 
initiated a theoretical upheaval over the last few years. Transparency of independent 
central banks is desirable for the enhancement of the effectiveness and accountability of 
central banking. At this point, the focus on language has been drawing much attention. 
Undoubtedly, the central bank guides the expectations of economic agents, and it is also 
part of its own backdrop because talk and the policy of disclosing certain information 
are to be interpreted as self-commitments of a central bank.  
More precisely, the central bank aims to share these expectations because of its 
interest in achieving its objectives. As new research emphasizes, central bank 
statements convey useful information if market participants perceive what a central 
bank is really saying, i.e. interpretation matters. This has caused the scientific 
community to become wary of traditional concepts of interaction between institutions. 
The new paradigm »matching deeds to words« leads to further questions: How, when 
and in which ways do statements by a central bank have a function in shaping the 
expectations of private agents? 
Current empirical studies shed light on the difficulties of answering these 
questions. Central banking and monetary policies have become a distinct consideration 
                                                           
12 Goodfriend, M. (1986), Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 17: 63-92. PD Dr. Elke Muchlinski 02/2009  7
of economists and theorists.
13 This has provoked new questions, distinct methods and 
views and opened up further investigations within the community of science. The 
compelling changes for central banking and monetary policy have evolved out of new 
perceptions and responsibility for price stability.  
As history reveals, central banking and monetary policy had to pass through a 
long painful process of learning and re-orientation. The function of central banks in the 
economy and their monetary policy strategy, their instruments and methods appeared to 
be something in the background, in the realm of a "temple of secrets".   
Regardless of the impressive literature on central bank transparency and 
communication, the question of how a central bank should talk is still being debated. As 
Blinder et al., state, in principle, central banks should, on principle, be transparent about 
their decisions and proceedings of monetary policy meetings as well as about their own 
view of future developments (Blinder/Goodhart et al 2001: 3-5). Therefore transparency 
focuses not simply on providing more or maximizing information, for instance, monthly 
reports, minutes, speeches and press releases, etc., but requires a certain way of 
conveying information to market participants. Poole emphasized that transparency is 
inevitably linked to communication which also lead to the risks of miscommunication 
and therefore misunderstanding.
14 I will return to that issue in my second type of 
consideration. 
At this point, more information does not imply greater transparency. First of all, 
the modern view of central banking implies that a central bank does not try to fool the 
public.
15  
                                                           
13 See Blinder/Ehrmann/Fratzscher et al (2008) ibid; Kohn, Donald L. (2005) Central Bank 
Communication. Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 
Philadelphia. January 9, 2005, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/ A 
pioneering work offered Kohn, Donald L./Sack, Brian (2003) Central Bank Talk: Does it Matter 
and Why? Washington, D.C.; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/
14 "It is hardly surprising that central bankers are more talkative than they were just a decade or 
so ago, and more concerned about how to improve transparency and communication with the 
market. Perhaps only one issue is settled: Transparency is important but is hard to accomplish 
because miscommunication is so easy.  Clearly, more talk does not necessarily mean greater 
transparency". Poole, W. (2004) FOMC: Transparency. 
http://www.stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/2004.html
15 "If the monetary authority can be clearer about what it is doing now and plans to do – not in 
the sense of setting future moves in stone, but rather in terms of explaining risks that might 
influence future policy – then market participants can improve their expectations of future short 
rates, and possibly reduce the premium for uncertainty". Ferguson, R.W. (1999) Transparency Is there a need for a coded language in central banking?  8
The modern view of central banking is rooted in the realm of central bank 
practice, which focuses on the effectiveness of monetary policy as practice. It tries to 
avoid assumptions or premises that are not linked to the contemporary world. An 
admitted fact is the asymmetry of time horizons of the different agents in different 
markets and the central bank. The goal of price stability is a long lasting objective a 
central bank can only try to achieve by acting in short time horizons, a practice which 
may conflict with the interests of market participants. 
Focusing on the expectations-building process also implies to investigating the 
interdependence and communicative interactions between the Federal Reserve Bank 
and agents in the markets. A central bank's power determines the short-term interest 
rate, whereas the long-term interest rate is in fact the crucial aspect upon which market 
participants direct their attention. As Blinder expounds: 
"The interest-sensitive components of aggregate demand react mainly to the real 
long rate while the central bank controls only the nominal short rate. In other words, 
the interest rate that the central bank can control doesn't matter (much), and the rates 
that really matter cannot be controlled” (Blinder 1998: 30).  
 
Transparency and the distinctive communicative interactions of the central bank 
with financial markets are not options but rather preconditions of modern central banks. 
There is no »invisible hand« which co-ordinates the central bank’s decision on interest 
rates with the result of an international equilibrium. 
In the traditional model world of central banking deductive reasoning and the 
premise of »neutrality of money« dominate, while transparency, accountability and 
credibility are linked to the premises of the model world itself. Contrary to the 
traditional view, in the modern paradigm of central banking transparency, 
accountability and credibility refer to verbal and non-verbal interactions and 
communication and therefore to the need for aiming at a common understanding. A 
central bank must be able to act flexibly which does not imply acting without self-
commitment. Transparency implies an understanding of what a central bank is in fact 
doing. Transparency is a result of verbal and non-verbal interactions and of reciprocal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and Responsibility in Monetary Policy, Remarks before the National Economists Club, 
Washington DC, September 9, 1999. URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
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relationships between a central bank and the market about changes of market variables 
and the perceived reaction by the central bank, the market and the public. 
Regarding the importance of talk, language and communication to monetary 
policy the Fed has been pursuing a new strategy of communication since 2000; and 
already since 1994 it has been announcing the target for the Federal Funds Rate:
16  
The Fed signals its verbal participation within a social context and reflects the 
reciprocal relationship with the market, which has to be interpreted. These are the bases 
for its reputation and credibility.  
Issing underlined that important point, because transparency is not a mental state 
but is rather rooted in acting and interacting:   
"Complete transparency of the underlying information set, as well as the thinking 
and ulterior motives behind central bankers' decision, is logically and practically 
impossible to achieve. (…) This reflects a deeper (philosophical) recognition of the 
limits of 'knowledge' and the impossibility of providing and communicating 
anything like a full description of reality: 'Reality is never transparent. What we see 
from any one angle is always only part of the picture" (Issing 1999: 507). 
 
 
A second type of consideration focuses on the question: 
 Is there a need for a coded language?  
 
The implication I am going to explain in this paper emerges from the proposition 
that words and sentences have no meaning beyond their use in a particular context. A 
coded language is an artificial language. 
The meaning of words or sentences and of understanding is rooted in 
communicative interaction, or action (respectively non-action) within a context. It was 
Watzlawick and his co-authors who revolutionized thinking in terms of communicative 
interaction.
17 Their important and in sciences well accepted conclusion is that it is not 
                                                           
16 "The language indicates the Committee's sense of the balance of risks in the outlook against 
the background of the Committee's long-run goals of price stability and sustainable economic 
growth. Specifically, it indicates whether the Committee believes that the risks are 'balanced 
with respect to prospects for both goals', 'weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate 
heightened inflation pressures, or 'weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate 
economic weakness”, Ferguson, R.W. (2001) ‘Transparency in Central Banking: Rationale and 
Recent Developments’, Remarks before the National Economists Club and Society of Govern-
ment Economists, Washington DC, April 2001, URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
17 Watzlawick, Paul/Beavin, Janet H./Jackson, Don D. (1967) Pragmatics of Human Communi-
cation. A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes. Mental Research 
Institute, Palo Alto, California, New York, WW. Norton & Company. Is there a need for a coded language in central banking?  10
possible to avoid communication. Even if a central bank hides itself behind "the secrets 
of a temple" it nevertheless adheres to a certain kind of communicative interaction or 
style, because a so-called non-action is perceived as an interaction – or more precisely 
as the avoidance of interaction. It is important to accept this research for economics as 
well in order to perceive which differences central bank interactions make and to 
enlighten the need for shaping a central bank's actions. 
As it is known from the history of science, any event is embedded in its 
historical context. It is not possible to separate the event from the context without 
creating a meaningless object. Furthermore, meaning and understanding are embedded 
in action. Focussing upon a single word – or a coded language – would imply the 
danger of non-understanding and of veiling the context in which a central bank acts. 
Relying on a coded language neglects the conditions under which the central bank acts 
to achieve its mandate. Therefore, a strategy of communicative interaction oriented to a 
coded language will be an impediment on the central bank's road to its mandate. The 
action of any institution like a central bank is a result of its acting capacity and its 
acceptance by society. To put it more precisely, a central bank's communicative 
interaction with the financial market cannot be depicted in terms of mechanics.
 18  
I now turn to Winkler’s approach.
19  He also defines transparency as linked to a 
communication strategy of a central bank and common understanding. He proposes a 
differentiated view of transparency focusing on "the twin roles of a monetary policy 
strategy: information efficiency and communication" (Winkler 2000: 15). Winkler 
proposes two dimensions of central bank communication: (…) internal and external 
communication. Both dimensions are important for achieving transparency. 
Furthermore, the process of communication is to be differentiated in a vertical and 
horizontal dimension, as seen in the gray and white boxes. These colored figures give a 
first impression of the problems any central bank has to deal with: the perception and 
attention that market participants do or do not pay to its statements or information. 
Winkler states that central banking or monetary policy respectively is best explained by 
the »language analogy«. He also claims that communication is a »vehicle for 
                                                           
18 Muchlinski, Elke (2006) Was meint Wittgenstein mit ‘In der Sprache wird alles 
ausgetragen’? Logos Verlag Berlin. (English title: ‘What does Wittgenstein mean with 'It is in 
language that it's all done'?) 
19 Winkler, Bernhard (2000) Which Kind of Transparency? On The Need For Clarity in Mone-
tary Policy-Making. ECB, Working Paper Series, No 26, Frankfurt am Main.  PD Dr. Elke Muchlinski 02/2009  11
information transmission« – However I think the term language has to be defined more 
précisely. 
The fundamental assumptions of his new approach to central bank 
communication are three concepts: clarity (C), honesty (H), and common understanding 
(CU).
  Clarity implies the strategy by central banks to structure and simplify 
information. Regarding heterogeneous agents in the market, a central bank has to 
differentiate its information, which can not be viewed as a homogenous good. The 
danger of confusion from multiple public messages or greater asymmetry of 
information forces it to provide differentiated information. The result is that the 
traditional assumption of »common knowledge« is meaningless because different 
agents or groups in the market will get different information, which they also perceive 
and interpret differently.
20
How then is understanding possible? "Without this sharing of reactions to com-
mon stimuli, thought and speech would have no particular content – that is no content at 
all." (Davidson 1991).
21 Understanding depends on how market participants do interact 
– verbal and non-verbal. 
"To understand the speech of another, I must be able to think of the same things she 
does; I must share her world. I don't have to agree with her in all matters, but in 
order to disagree we must entertain the same proposition, with the same subject 
matter, and the same standard of truth. Communication depends, then, on each 
communicant having, and correctly thinking that the other has, the concept of a 
shared world, an intersubjective world. (…) The conclusion of these considerations 
is that rationality is a social trait. Only communication has it".
22
 
Honesty indicates that the meaning of a central bank statement cannot be an 
external one. Winkler defines honesty as "the degree to which the representation of 
information employed in external communication corresponds to the actual structuring 
of information adopted internally. (…) Conflicts may, however, arise between internal 
and external communication needs" (Winkler 2000, 20).  
                                                           
20 The definition of the common knowledge assumption says: "An event is common knowledge 
among a group of agents if each one knows it, if each one knows that the others know it, if each 
one knows that each one knows that the others know it, and so on… Thus, common knowledge 
is the limit of a potentially infinite chain or reasoning about knowledge", Geanakoplos, J. 
(1992) Common knowledge. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6 (4): 53-58. 
21 Davidson, Donald (1991) Three Varieties of Knowledge. In: Griffiths, A.P. (1991) A.J. Ayer. 
Memorial Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 153-166. 
22 Davidson, Donald (1982) Rational Animals. In: Dialectica, 36: 317-327. Is there a need for a coded language in central banking?  12
Avoiding the traditional notion of common knowledge, Winkler examines the 
relevance of common understanding. Since monetary policy acts on the basis of rules, 
these rules are to be interpreted as a "coordinating function in organizing public 
discourse" (ibid: 23). He emphasizes the importance of the sender within his modified 
receiver-audience model in order to conclude: "transparency rests on the degree of 
common understanding between the two and is thus a social phenomenon" (ibid). The 
reason for this assertion is that central bankers' language is often vague. Vagueness is 
characteristic of language, which is a social phenomenon. Trying to express a central 
bank's or central banker's statement in formal or coded language would circumvent 
common understanding.  
A central bank is compelled to focus on special information and to investigate 
certain economic developments, i.e. the monetary transmission process which differs 
greatly between countries, or, for further examples, prices of goods markets, currencies, 
the rate of economic growth, etc. Furthermore, a central bank has to communicate 
certain data according to an economic environment. This clearly describes clearly their 
role as a monetary institution. Winkler concludes: 
"From this perspective a monetary policy strategy is like a language. Like a 
language it provides tools, and a frame for reasoning, and a vehicle for 
communication" (Winkler 2000: 23).  
 
At this point, it should be emphasized, that language is not a vehicle to transmit 
ready-made information by a sender to a receiver who is like an empty box, which just 
receives information passively. This antique »conduit-metaphor«, which is embedded in 
the traditional theory of communication
23 is neither compatible with modern central 
bank theory and practice nor with the modern view of communication and the function 
of language. Consequently Winkler states: 
  "The notion of transparency as common understanding not only refers to 
information and modes of interpretation shared between central bank and the public. 
Communication takes place not between two monolithic players but between 
multiple senders (…) and multiple receivers. In such a setting, a central bank's 
announcements also perform additional internal and external coordination functions" 
(ibid: 24).  
 
Let us summarize Winkler's view so far: The avoidance of the common 
knowledge assumption opens another theoretical perspective on the interaction of a 
central bank with the heterogeneous audience and different markets.  
                                                           
23 Lasswell, Harold D. (1948) The Structure and Function of Communication in Society. In: 
Lyman, Brian (Ed.) (1948) The Communication of Ideas. New York, Harper: 37-51.PD Dr. Elke Muchlinski 02/2009  13
Monetary policy and central banking can neither be described by a linear input-
output-transmission nor by pure deductive arguments as it is usually defined in 
traditional models on central banking.
24 "Car and driver: (is) a misleading analogy" as 
Bernanke (2004) claimed of the often used metaphor in central banking theory.
25  
At this point certain characteristics of coded language should be explained and 
the term itself defined. What is, after all, a coded language? Where does the meaning of 
a coded language come from? Is it possible to say that a coded language works (only) 
under particular circumstances? What can be said about the environment in which a 
coded language is used? What are the implications of making reference to a coded 
language? Are language codes in fact rules? What gives meaning to a coded language in 
fact? It can be said that the meaning of a coded language is rooted in a universal rule or 
unique or logical structure. Recalling the example of the car and car-driver it is possible 
to image setting certain limits in order to define the context of car-driving. It is also 
possible to define it by making a list containing all the elements contained in that 
context: roads, maps, cars, light, rules of traffic, wheels, steering wheels, spark plug, 
fuel, etc. A coded language is rooted in a pre-defined system. There should be no 
vagueness in its meaning because it is deductively linked to the system itself.  
A coded language can be explained by a list of all the distinguishing marks or 
features which provide an invariant context and situation. The meaning of a code is 
given ex ante, ahead of its use. The meaning is incorporated as a fixed rule which is 
itself defined independently of changing environment and context. Here we can see the 
reason why a coded language is free of ambiguity and vagueness. If this premise of 
non-ambiguity and non-vagueness bears relevance it might seem to be the best method 
for a central bank to communicate with different agents in the heterogeneous financial 
markets. The non-ambiguousness and exactness of a coded language should lead to an 
understanding without being in any way misleading. It also defines the mechanism of 
understanding in order to avoid a discontinuity of understanding or a discontinuity 
generated by misleading elements. Therefore, vagueness and non-ambiguity of the 
meaning in a coded language are excluded by definition. 
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A coded language, however, is an artificial language which cannot fulfill the 
genuine task of guiding the market expectations by a central bank. A coded language 
does not create specific institutional facts or respond to them.  
How then could a coded language be a link between actors, including the central 
bank working through markets?  
"Monetary policy works through the market, so perceptions of likely market 
reactions must be relevant to policy formation and actual market reactions must be 
relevant to the time and magnitude of monetary policy effects. There is no escaping 
this" (Blinder 1998: 60).   
 
The functions of language in daily communicative interactions simply cannot be 
explained by an analogy to a mechanical impulse-resonance. A central bank's talk and 
communication and its meaning and understanding are not based on mechanical actions 
and reactions as assumed in the traditional model view of central banking. Moreover, 
meaning and understanding, as encapsulated in the paradigm »matching deeds to 
words« are not achievable as mechanical procedure because they are generated through 
a process of communicative interaction. 
A coded language – like the instructions how to use a car or a machine – can in 
effect only be anchored in an invariant context or environment – for example, 
regardless of whether one drives on the left or the right, or, to take another example, 
like the instructions for use of a machine translated into many different languages. The 
car is itself defined by certain mechanical properties. Instructions on how to understand 
a coded language in order to get a drivers license demonstrates how the use and 
understanding of a coded language differs from the everyday language. It makes sense 
to use a coded language in an invariant environment composed of and indeed designed 
(by?) using mechanical rules. This generates a certain behavioral pattern which is 
essential in order to avoid car crashes by establishing a strictly regular order applying to 
car drivers.  
Any approach to the economy as a simplified model or machine overlooks the 
importance of different interactions and the need of the central bank to influence the 
expectations-building of different agents in order to achieve its mandate of price 
stability. The activities of speaking and of decision-making processes are surrounded by 
uncertainty. Each of the simplified models involving an analogy to a mechanical 
arrangement derives from the classical model of communication in which language and 
interactions by the receiving agents should be eliminated. The classical model pictures 
communication as involving causality between two mechanical impulses. The demand PD Dr. Elke Muchlinski 02/2009  15
for a coded language conforms to the demand for behavioral regularity within such an 
analogical framework.   
As the example above indicates, a coded language could probably work within a 
stimulus-response-mechanism among agents and machines in order to set a machine in 
motion. However such a stimulus-response-mechanism is not a model to capture and 
understand the communicative interaction between a central bank and the agents of the 
financial markets. The analogy of human behavior to a machine misses the point of 
economic interactions in the financial markets, not only because of the different time 
horizons but also because of the interdependency of these actions according to 
monetary policy being worked out through markets.  
The view of agents set in motion by a coded language like billiard balls is 
misleading. To understand how 'monetary policy works through the market, one needs 
to acknowledge the processes of perception and the understanding of the central bank’s 
talk and communication within markets involving many different market agents. The 
more a central bank tries to avoid such misunderstandings through a commitment to 
communication via a coded language the greater the risk will be of generating 
misunderstanding among market agents.  
Indeed, the risks of a coded language are evident. Since market actors tend to 
look for particular hints in order to make their own decisions, a coded language will in 
fact increase the problem of the central bank's inflexibility to alter its own decisions.  
The assumption underlying a coded language is that the future of financial 
markets or the economy in general is capable of being conceived with great clarity and 
less – or indeed no – uncertainty. The coded language appears to open an opportunity of 
interpretation by following a clear and unambiguous road map on the highway toward 
financial success. A coded language appears as a sure guide towards the best choice 
among financial or economic opportunities directly and hence supposes certainty in a 
world of uncertainty. This is illusory.  
From a car-driver's point of view, reaching the desired destination indicates 
either the success of the way selected or at least its partial success. The expectations 
addressed towards the use of the coded language in central banking must, however, be 
disappointed because the language activities of communication, meaning and 
understanding are a complex task. 
In contrary to its assumed beneficial effects, the use of a coded language will in 
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markets. Coded language is by definition an exact and a non-vague language whereas 
everyday language is not. Everyday language is indeed characterized by non-exactness 
and vagueness but, it must be heavily emphasized, not its meaninglessness. Vague 
terms and concepts are not 'bounded', whereas codes are. However, the boundaries of a 
coded language do not have any relevance to the shaping and development of monetary 
policy in practice.
26
There is no choice whether to acknowledge the uncertainty of central banking or 
not. With uncertainty in the landscape, central banking needed to be anchored.  
Just as poetry expressed in rhymes by no means leads to greater credibility of 
the poem and thus to increased ease of memorization, so do axioms and deductive 
premises define the sense of deductive sentences. Since the projection of mathematical 
and logical theories or axioms onto the world of experience is beyond the model world, 
the model view is for this reason first of all a metaphoric approach. Stekeler-Weithofer 
stated: "Exactness is a property of a model or formal theory and therefore limited in its 
proper application on real experience."
27  
Acting means that agents shape contexts and also create new contexts by their 
ways of acting.
28 An important implication regarding the context or situation is first and 
foremost that any communicative interactions require the use of language as a public 
medium since private language could neither be used to shape situations and contexts 
nor create new ones.  
The risk of a coded language is that any change in monetary policy action will 
induce the change of expectations regarding future actions of a central bank. There is no 
doubt that a coded language can guide reactions in particular directions, e.g. it can 
induce so called iterative movements. To explain a word requires going back to the 
language-game itself, which is also changeable. It is important to emphasize that a 
central bank's pattern of acting structures the particular reality, i.e. the environment and 
hence the relations of market interactions.  
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This is of crucial importance for its task in guiding market expectations. A 
central bank's way of acting creates the normative meaning of sentences. Concepts are 
embedded in the language game.  Not only times are a changing…but also language-
games are changing and bringing therefore a change in concepts and the meaning of 
words. The meaning does not arise out of a pre-fixed or pre-determined world.  
The problem of a central bank's talk based on a coded language is pointed out by 
Issing:  
"Code words can be readily identified and taken into account in market operations; 
they can reduce uncertainty in the run-up to meetings of the decision making body, 
and they can help to avoid errors in the short-term planning of operations and curb 
the volatility of interest rates. However, with the use of such code words, the central 
bank puts itself under pressure to honor a quasi-promise".
29 
 
Karen Johnson, of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
argued that central banks need first of all to create a "communication language. 
Currently, they tend to use very few words, often seen as coded language".
30 Johnson 
explained the problems which arise out of the use of a coded language:  
"When these words seem to work with the target audience they are used over and 
again. But then, if the words differ only a little bit from one time to another, they 
may be mistakenly interpreted as a policy change" (ibid).  
 
The risk of a coded language is that any change in monetary policy action will 
induce the change of expectations regarding future actions of a central bank. There is no 
doubt that a coded language can guide reactions in particular directions, e.g. it can 
induce so called iterative movements. A good example is the well known metaphor of a 
'run on the bank' which is, in effect, a self-fulfilling prophecy, and has caused many 
bank crises. There exists no doubt concerning the dangers of a situation in which coded 
language may guide mass behavior as the history of communication has shown.
31
In my view a coded language increases the uncertainty surrounding monetary 
policy because a coded language does not suit a changing environment. The consensus 
regarding economics and central bank communication in the literature can be described 
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in short as "central bank talk matters". The reason why talk or communication matters is 
regularly given by a description of important parts of the transmission process.
32  
Whereas the economic data always provides their own ambiguity, the 
Chairman’s remark concerning the empirical findings seems to confirm the uncertainty. 
The Chairman remains reticent when the data could not be read as a certain 
unambiguous description. The risk that statements by the Federal Reserve Bank 
accompanying the interest rate move could lead to some unsettling signals in the long 
run is evident. With uncertainty in the landscape, central banks – like other institutions 
– need to be anchored. The uncertainty would be intensified by the use of a coded 
language. In contrast to a coded language, the use of everyday language – the language 
in practice – configures a certain context understood by participants of the financial 
market and the central bank. As pattern of acting and a way of articulation it is 
impregnated by the changes of the context.  
Language, meaning and understanding cannot be anchored in an artificial 
system. The use of code words or signal words by a central bank does not itself provide 
a deeper understanding of how and when the central bank is going to take action. This 
depends on the perception by market participants.  
To understand the central bank's deeds and words as a coherent procedure 
requires one to perceive the central bank's talk or communicative action as embedded in 
the long run framework of its mandate. It is essential for the use of the everyday 
language. This usage – the language game – is not independent of the environment, 
context and facts.
 33 It is essential for the language-game that no doubt appears about 
whether use of language is embedded in the environment.
34
Taking into account the communicative interaction between the central bank and 
the financial market, this given ambient environment is part of the management of 
affairs in the contemporary world. It is configured by the articulated interactions. 
Therefore it is appropriate to refer to such a "language-game" to provide a picture of the 
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totality of the embedded actions, rules, conventions, implications, interpretation and 
persuasions of such communicative interactions.  
What can be said about the environment? It is composed of people and 
institutions interacting via these means. It is not a system which can be determined by 
or defined by deductive reasoning or by purely mechanical elements. It is a 'game' 
because every participant plays a certain role by acting. One is reminded of 
Shakespeare lines: "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players. 
They have their exists and their entrances; and one man in his time plays many parts" 
(As You Like It, Act II, Scene VII). The use of language is a way of acting. Language 
of the actors is neither primarily addressed to names or signs, nor to things, objects or 
words. Rather it leads to a coherence of the meaning and understanding in the 
communicative interactions in that field, framework or context. "Language-game" is an 
appropriate concept to capture and describe the communicative interactions between a 
central bank and financial markets. As Wittgenstein explained: "A game, a language, a 
rule is an institution."
35 The notion "language-game" does not mean a language-'play' 
because language-game is a concept which is coherently connected with working or 
employing language. In using language, we do not reflect it, we do not contemplate it, 
we do not interpret, but we are simply involved in the language-game. The language 
game is the primary thing which gives meaning to the sentence.
36
  As pattern of acting the language-games are not invariable throughout the time. 
This is also true for the language games of the Federal Reserve Bank. As pattern of 
acting and a way of articulation it is impregnated by the changes of the context and 
environment.
37  
If one says, for instance, the code employed in a language corresponds to a 
particular sense or meaning, this does not of itself lead to a meaning and understanding 
but rather just to substitution. The meaning, implication or interpretation still has to 
emerge from the interactive process involving all the participants in the communication.  
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Where a redirection of the monetary policy is required, a central bank's 
announcement based on a coded language has, in any case to be explained ex post in 
every day language. A coded language which has to be explained subsequently in 
everyday language will not be credible. Moreover this re-interpretation diminishes the 
credibility of the central bank because its efforts to translate the coded language into the 
everyday language will fail. The coded language can be seen as a kind of private 
language. A coded language maintains a sense by itself regardless of any further 
interactions between the authors, agents or institutions. It is like the traffic light based 
on the simple rule. A coded language is rooted in a certain system of definition. 
Why precisely does a coded language restrict a central bank's methods and 
possibilities to react immediately and flexibly? If the central bank starts to explain the 
meaning of its coded language this would be inevitably perceived as a deviation from 
any prior statements of the central bank.  
To sum up this consideration: A coded language relies on particular premises 
such as unambiguousness, exactness and a bounded concept of words and their 
meaning. Furthermore the assumption underlying a coded language implies the 
maintenance of a correspondence of objects with their names and objects seen as non-
vague entities or understood through a non-vague ontology, objects as unique, bounded, 
exactly measurable and true.  
The presumption of a pre-given meaning of a word or sentence is however, 
without doubt problematic since the meaning is rooted neither in internal, mental states 
(in the intentions of the agents), in the intentions of the agents, nor in invariant 
situations. The classical view of communication neglects the functions of language and 
communicative interaction as a principle for organizing and systematizing the 
ambiguity which cannot be eliminated. The classical view of communication 
contradicts the modern view of language and cognitive sciences. Language in its 
function and use cannot be reduced to numbers or labels. The meaning of the language, 
sentences and words is a result of the language's use in practice. Since the use of a word 
or a sentence is always embedded in practice and interactions of agents, institutions and 
in their expectations, goals and desire to be understood, the meaning and the 
understanding of a word or sentence depends on that contextual framework. This can 
only be predicted by the question on how and whether a particular word or sentence 
would be understood in a supposed or expected environment in which the word or 
sentence has been used.  PD Dr. Elke Muchlinski 02/2009  21
Using a language is part of an activity (Wittgenstein) or speech act (Searle). 
Therefore the meaning of a used word or sentence is not fixed. There exist different 
meanings of a word or sentence or a multiplicity (see Muchlinski 2009, 2008, 2006). 
  The language or »the language game« is not based on fixed rules, but on  
"regularity, on agreement in action. (…) We say that, in order to communicate, 
people must agree with one another about the meaning of the words. But the 
criterion for this agreement is not just agreement with reference to definitions, e.g. 
ostensive definitions – but also an agreement in judgments. It is essential for 
communication that we agree in a large number of judgments".
38  
 
Different uses in varying contexts imply different meanings. How can we obtain 
the knowledge about how to use the word? Mostly, we use a particular word without 
asking ourselves if we understand it. The meaning of a word or sentence respectively 
does not primarily emanate from a prior – more particularly, from an apriori - 
interpretation. If the financial market starts to interpret the utterance of the Federal 
Reserve, uncertainty about the meaning of the central bank's talk has already been 
achieved in the market. In the case of raising doubts on the meaning of a sentence in 
practice the interpretation makes sense. An interpretation does not lead to additional 
meaning of the sentence in context because the interpretation itself is part of the 
situation in which the sentence has been used. 
The description of a debate between the central bank and the agents of financial 
markets is understandable only within its particular history. Several current research 
papers to which I have referred here provide evidence of this. Such an approach evolved 
within the dimension of a general history of economic thought and attempts to discover 
the historical realm of institutions, the interdependence of economic processes and the 
varieties of social relations and interactions which are themselves the basis for an 
evolution of discursive methods and structures.  
If central banks try to act on the basis of a coded language they would adapt a 
given meaning of sentences independent of the context and the culture. This would 
contradict sharply the continuity of changing times, contexts and environments and 
therefore information as being subject to relationship. As current debates in central 
banking explain different cultures also generate different ways of understanding and 
conceptualizing transparency and communication. The debates about the need for a 
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disclosure policy outline the problems regarding the status and democratic surroundings 
of a central bank. The need for a disclosure policy has to be treated in a different 
manner. Regardless of how the mandate of a central bank is precisely established in 
different countries, the imperative to implement a successful monetary policy to achieve 
price stability has been accepted as an 'iron law' of central banking in the economy. This 
position that the meaning is given by a mental state immediately collapses if we 
acknowledge that language is not a veil of thought i.e., it is not neutral towards 
thoughts. Language does not reveal objects or ontological things like central banks, 
money, institutions. "And to say 'if it did not exist, it could have no name' is to say as 
much and as little as: if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-
game” (Wittgenstein 1978: § 50). 
A coded language is meaningless regarding monetary policy strategy and the 
mandate of a central bank. As Wittgenstein outlines: 
"We often compare the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, 
but cannot say that someone who is using language must be playing such a game. – 
But if you say that our language only approximate to such calculi you are standing 
on the very brink of a misunderstanding. For then it may look as if what we were 
talking about were an ideal language. As if our logic is so to speak, a logic for a 
vacuum. – Whereas logic does not treat of language; and as if it took the logician to 
shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like" (Wittgenstein 1978: § 81).  
 
An ideal language is not appropriate for the need of understanding: "When we 
talk of language as a symbolism used in an exact calculus, that which is in our mind can 
be found in the sciences and in mathematics. Our ordinary use of language conforms to 
this standard of exactness only in rare cases."
39  
Any demand for a coded language implies the elimination of the arbitrariness of 
colloquial language. This would necessarily also imply depriving the language of its 
function. As was outlined, a word possesses multiple characters regarding different 
contexts and uses.  
Blinder/Goodhart et al (2001) argue that central bank talk and communication 
have the role of mitigating an unstable environment and uncertainty, of diminishing 
volatility and therefore high risk. They refer to an important feature of language within 
contexts and practices. The use of everyday language diminishes "uncertainty" because 
it is anchored in those contexts and environments. The new paradigm of central banking 
»matching deeds to words« is not compatible with a coded language approach. 
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Language matters as 'sens pratique', but not as 'scholasticism'.
40 According to 
modern view of language theory, language is not only a vehicle of thoughts. Language 
is not a neutral thing.  
Vagueness is characteristic of language, which is a social phenomenon. Trying 
to express a central bank's or central banker's statement in formal language would 
preclude common understanding. As empirical evidence on central bank transparency 
and information policy strategy documents, the language a central bank has chosen to 
express or explain its monetary strategy may differ considerably across countries and 
central banks.
41
Nevertheless their need to focus on special information and to investigate certain 
economic developments, i.e. the monetary transmission process which differs greatly 
between countries, or prices of goods markets, currencies, the rate of economic growth, 
etc., furthermore to create and communicate certain data according to an economic 
environment describes clearly their role as a monetary institution. As monetary 
institutions, they do have comparable monetary strategies in order to achieve the 
effectiveness of monetary policy.  
Regarding the every day language Wittgenstein emphazised:  
"When we talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of 
every day. (…) You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and you think of 
the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the 
word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy 





I have thus explained why both of the concepts "matching deeds to words" 
(Blinder) and "we do what we say' and 'say what we do" (Issing), are not encapsulated 
in a logical semantic or in deductive reasoning but rather in a way of communicating 
action. The use of the everyday language has its reference in both concepts which refer 
to the means of acting and not to a coded language. Credibility and transparency refer to 
the central bank's practice, not to abstract premises. Achieving transparency and 
                                                           
40 Gebauer, G. (2005), 'Praktischer Sinn und Sprache', in Colliot-Thélène, C., E. Francois and G. 
Gebauer (eds) (2005), Theorie and Praxis. Pierre Bourdieus Werk in Frankreich und 
Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp). 
41 See Lambert, Richard (2006) Central Bank Communications: Best Practices in Advanced 
Economies. At the IMF Sonsored Regional Seminar on Central Bank Communications, 
Mumbai, 23. January 2006, http://www.imf.orgIs there a need for a coded language in central banking?  24
credibility can only be defined as a degree of transparency or degree of credibility 
because both concepts refer to the means of acting. Therefore the meaning and 
understanding of a central bank's communicative interaction arise as sens pratique. As 
the use and meaning of words cannot be separated from context, the development of a 
'language code' of a central bank is not desirable.  
I have tried to elaborate further reasons to support the "language analogy" which 
should replace the "car analogy" in central bank literature. I have emphasized several 
aspects which describe the changing environment of the central bank. As the meaning 
and understanding cannot be separated from context, a coded language would in fact 
increase the uncertainty which surrounds the central bank's action. Transparency and 
credibility are the result of verbal and non-verbal interactions and of reciprocal 
relationships between a central bank and the market regarding changes in market 
variables and the perceived reaction by the central bank, market and public.  PD Dr. Elke Muchlinski 02/2009  25
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